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Abstract
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s two-sided pricing strategies in a setting with
seller competition, which gives rise to not only positive cross-side network effects between buyers
and sellers, but also a negative same-side network effect among sellers. We show that platform
pricing depends crucially on the characteristics associated with market liquidity, which contrasts
with the previous studies that point to the two sides’ relative demand elasticities and/or network
effects. A market is said to be more liquid when it has less friction, resulting in a larger total
surplus for the platform economy and hence greater equilibrium entry on both sides. We find
that in response to higher market liquidity, the platform raises the buyer entry fee and lowers
the seller entry fee. The platform’s subsidy strategy is consistent: market liquidity is conducive
to seller subsidy but hinders buyer subsidy.
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1 Introduction
A two-sided platform is a market where two distinctive groups of users transact such that each
member benefits more from the transactions when more members from the other group are using
the platform (Rysman 2009). For example, Microsoft Xbox is a gaming platform where gamers
and game developers trade. The more game titles that developers provide, the more enjoyment
a gamer derives from using Xbox; conversely, the more consumers purchasing Xbox consoles, the
more profit a game developer can make. Another example is Airbnb which is a platform that joins
hosts and guests for renting living spaces. Either side of Airbnb users derives more benefit when
the opposite side becomes larger in size. A variety of other platforms are observed in practice and
discussed in the literature (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).
A privately-owned platform needs to determine how to charge the two sides of users appropri-
ately, as optimal pricing to the two sides are interconnected. A lower fee on one side can increase
the network size of that side, which allows the platform to charge a higher fee on the other side as
a result of the cross-side network effect. This leads to the key questions that have received much
attention in the literature:1 Under what condition should a platform subsidize one side by charging
a below-cost fee and gain revenues from the other side? Which side to subsidize? How to adjust
the two fees simultaneously in response to a parameter change?
The established answer to these questions is that a platform’s optimal fee structure, in par-
ticular which side to subsidize, depends crucially on a comparison between the two sides’ demand
elasticity and/or network externalities. In their survey paper, Rochet and Tirole’s (2006) sum-
marized that “attracting one side by lowering price is particularly profitable for the platform if
this side creates substantial externalities on the other side.” Armstrong (2006) shows a consistent
insight: “It is possible that the profit-maximizing outcome involves group 1, say, being offered a
subsidized service... [T]his occurs if the group’s elasticity of demand is high and/or the external
benefit enjoyed by group 2 is large.”
Although these conditions describe the equilibrium elegantly, applying them can be difficult
because the key variables for making subsidy decisions—network effects and demand elasticities—
are likely to be endogenous. For example, the magnitude of cross-side network effect can be sensitive
to the numbers of users on both sides. When a side is increasingly crowded, each user on that side
1The pioneering studies of two-sided platforms such as Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003,
2006), Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), and Armstrong (2006) have devoted much attention to the pricing questions
(see also the survey by Rysman 2009). In fact, Rochet and Tirole (2003) have gone so far as to regard the possibility
of cross-subsidy as the defining feature of two-sided markets: “A market with network externalities is a two-sided
market if platforms can effectively cross-subsidize between different categories of end users that are parties to a
transaction.” They went on to highlight the central question faced by platforms: “The platform owners in all these
industries devote much attention to their price-allocation business model: Is it more important to woo one side or
the other?”
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may make a smaller contribution to the other side. If that is the case, bringing an additional user
on the crowded side is unlikely to have a strong cross-side impact. Similarly, demand elasticity
is likely to depend on the platform’s equilibrium prices unless users’ entry costs follow a specific
distribution. Because endogenous variables are involved, often with the need to compare two or
more endogenous variables, the subsidy conditions commonly accepted in the literature are hard
to evaluate.
Our research intends to address this difficulty by endogenizing network effects and expressing
the equilibrium conditions solely in exogenous parameters. We build a standard pricing model of
monopoly platform, which is assumed to be the only place where buyers and sellers can trade. Each
side’s trading choices are explicitly analyzed based on market conditions and user and product
characteristics. This allows cross-side network effects to arise endogenously in both directions.
Other variables such as network sizes and demand elasticities are also endogenously determined.
By endogenizing users’ trading decisions, we illustrate that network effects exists not only
across the two sides, but also within the same side among sellers. In our model, sellers compete
in price; a seller’s profit drops when more sellers enter the platform. We refer to this property
as negative same-side network effect. Most studies of two-sided platforms have assumed away
user interactions within the same side (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006,
Armstrong 2006), but as we will explain, same-side network effect introduces asymmetry between
the two sides, leading to different conclusions and new insights for platform pricing. Due to the
very two-sidedness of the platform business model, when a parameter changes to encourage the
entry on one side, in equilibrium it will also encourage the entry on the other side. If rivalry mainly
exists among sellers but not among buyers, a larger size of sellers benefits buyers but hurts sellers,
while a larger size of buyers benefits sellers without hurting buyers. The joint effect is that the
total surplus is increasingly generated from the buyer side as the platform network expands. This
would have direct implications for the platform’s optimal fee structures.
The most important finding arising from our endogenization exercise is that the platform’s
optimal pricing decisions depends critically on market liquidity. A market is said to be more liquid
when it has less friction, resulting in a larger total surplus for the platform economy and hence
greater equilibrium entry on both sides. In our model, greater liquidity may result from a larger
number of potential users, lower entry costs, stronger buyer preference for product differentiation,
and product quality that varies more and/or rises on average. By raising the total trading surplus,
these factors lead to expanded entry scale on both sides in equilibrium.
We find that when the market is more liquid, the platform should raise buyer fees and reduce
seller fees; when the market is less liquid, the platform does the opposite. The results hold even
when a fee becomes negative, i.e., the platform is more likely to subsidize sellers in a more liquid
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market, and subsidize buyers in a less liquid market. The intuition can be understood as follows. A
marginal cut of the seller fee reduces the platform’s revenue from sellers, but the resulting greater
number of sellers benefits buyers, which allows the platform to raise the buyer fee and collect
more revenues there. A seller fee is optimal when the platform’s buyer-side gain exactly offsets
its seller-side loss. If the market becomes more liquid, the network sizes of sellers and buyers
both increase. However, due to the asymmetric same-side effect—the rivalry among sellers but
not among buyers—the buyer-side gain overweights the seller-side loss, making it optimal for the
platform to reduce the seller fee and raise the buyer fee.
Our central finding has two important and closely related implications. First, platform pricing
is related to characteristics of the market, i.e., the two sides combined, rather than each side
considered in separation or a comparison between the two sides. As a result, how a parameter
affects the optimal fee structure depends on how it affects liquidity (whether total surplus increases
or decreases) regardless of the channel through which it exerts the impact (whether from the buyer
or seller side). Second, the platform’s response to increased liquidity is to favor sellers: the seller
fee is reduced while the buyer fee is raised. Such discrimination between buyers and sellers does not
arise in most existing papers, where subsidy is explained by greater demand elasticity or network
externality on a particular side, so a side-specific response is linked to a side-specific parameter
change. But as we have argued above, the platform should pay attention to the collective property
of the two sides rather than a comparison between them. If so, what distinguishes between buyers
and sellers when the platform decides which fee to raise and which fee to lower? Our results
demonstrate that buyers and sellers may differ in important aspects. In our model, the difference
is caused by negative same-side effect among sellers but not buyers. Given the ubiquitous price
competition in real life, this is a reasonable assumption.2 More importantly, it demonstrates the
role of side asymmetry in platform pricing.
Our finding is different from the established conclusions, which usually “obtain comparative
statics results that fit with standard intuition.” (Rochet and Tirole 2006, p.659). An example
concerns the impact of an exogenous shift of a side’s demand function.3 We show that a drop in
2Rivalry among sellers is often inevitable, whereas that among buyers is not always present or is likely to be
weaker than seller-side rivalry. There may even be positive network effect among buyers, as examined in studies of
traditional one-sided network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986; Farrell and Saloner 1985, 1986).
3Another example involves captive users. Rochet and Tirole’s (2006) survey cited their own study (Rochet and
Tirole 2003): “[A] factor affecting elasticities on a given side is the size of the installed base of end-users on that side.
When the number of, say, captive buyers increases, the buyer price naturally increases, and the seller price decreases
as attracting sellers yields a higher collateral profit on the buyer’s side.” Our model would predict the same effect
(higher buyer fee and lower seller fee) by captive buyers, but for a different reason (captive buyers increase market
liquidity). Since Rochet and Tirole’s (2003) two sides are symmetric, they would have predicted that captive sellers
have the opposite effect (higher seller fee and lower buyer fee), but our model would predict that captive sellers have
the same effect (higher buyer fee and lower seller fee).
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seller entry cost induces the platform to reduce the seller fee (and raise the buyer fee). This result
is counter intuitive, as standard (one-sided) monopoly pricing would suggest that a decrease in
entry cost shifts up the demand function, so the platform should increase the seller fee. Viewed
from the lens of market liquidity, however, our result is easy to understand: The seller fee drops
because a lower entry cost on the seller side increases market liquidity. In comparison, Rochet and
Tirole (2003) concludes that when the seller demand shifts up (due to, say, a larger seller surplus
caused by the presence of marquee buyers), the seller price will increase while the buyer price will
decrease. Similarly, Armstrong (2006) would have suggested that a drop in seller-side cost and a
drop in buyer-side cost should pull the platform’s optimal pricing in opposite directions. However,
we show that a drop in either side’s entry cost has the same effect on the platform’s pricing strategy.
Our conclusions differ from these papers because the endogenization enables us to construct the
two sides’ demands that are truly interconnected,4 and to derive equilibrium conditions completely
devoid of any endogenous variables.
Our research makes three contributions. First, we provide new insights to an old question of
what a platform should consider in its pricing strategies and how the two fees should be adjusted.
At the root of these insights are two powerful ideas: the interconnection between the two sides and
the possible asymmetry between the two sides. Given the very nature of two-sided markets, the
interconnection should be expected, and yet most papers have not fully accounted for it. While
exactly how the two sides differ may depend on empirical relevance and modeling techniques,
we show that the presence of side asymmetry can lead to very different conclusions in two-sided
platforms. Second, we demonstrate the importance of endogenizing network effects, i.e., to derive
user surpluses from first principles rather than from reduced-form assumptions. Endogenization has
at least three benefits: all endogenous variables are excluded from equilibrium conditions so that
the conclusions can be more definite; the two sides are connected in a natural and coherent way;
same-side interactions can no longer be ignored. The last benefit is particularly useful because it is a
natural way to generate side asymmetry, as same-side interactions can differ between the two sides
in sign and/or magnitude, while cross-side effects are generally symmetric. Third, our findings
are directly useful to practitioners. Containing no endogenous variables, our conditions (both
necessary and sufficient) are expressed in six parameters with well defined economic meaning, and
the conclusions are definite in terms of which fee to raise and which fee to reduce. Such comparative
statics results are directly testable and can provide useful guidance to managers.
4Rochet and Tirole (2003) set up their model in such a way that the connection between the two sides’ demands
is relatively weak: “The surplus of a buyer, (bB − pB)NS , depends on the number of sellers NS , but the buyer
‘quasi-demand function’, NB = Pr(bB ≥ pB) = DB(pB), is independent of the number of sellers.” (p.995).
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2 Related Literature
Most studies of platforms have assumed away same-side interactions and arrived at conclusions
that treat the two sides symmetrically.5 In a pioneering work, Rochet and Tirole (2003) study a
platform’s optimal per-transaction charges in a setting with pure usage externalities between two
sides that display symmetric and independent demands. They find that the two optimal fees are
proportional to their respective demand elasticities. Armstrong (2006) focuses on pure membership
externalities. Based on implicit equilibrium price formula, he concludes that a platform is more
likely to subsidize the side with greater demand elasticity and/or network externality. Rochet and
Tirole (2006) survey the literature and provide a general model that encompasses both usage and
membership externalities. They conclude that the literature obtained “comparative statics results
that fit with standard intuition.” (p.659). They also discuss an interesting property of platform
pricing “in the form of a simple ‘seesaw principle’: a factor that is conducive to a high price on
one side, to the extent that it raises the platform’s margin on that side, tends also to call for a low
price on the other side as attracting members on that other side becomes more profitable.” (p.659).
Our findings confirm the seesaw principle despite many differences in modeling and conclusion.
While the above three papers start at the utility level, Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) introduce
exogenous cross-side network effects at the level of reduced-form demand functions. They show
that which side is subsidized “depends on cross-price elasticities as well as the relative sizes of the
two-sided network effects.” (p.1496).
Several more recent studies have started to explore the asymmetry between the two sides of a
platform. In the context of payment card platform, Wright (2012) points out an inherent asymmetry
as the explanation of why retailers are charged too much: Through their endogenous pricing,
merchants internalizes the benefit that cardholders enjoy when joining the platform, but consumers
ignore such cross-side benefits. Baye and Morgan (2001) investigate sellers’ incentive to advertise
their prices on a platform (“information gatekeeper”) and buyers’ incentive to subscribe to the
price information. They show that the platform tends to charge a relatively low fee to buyers and
a relatively high fee to sellers. For both sides, the alternative to making use of the platform is to
transact without the price information, so the benefit of joining and not joining the platform are
both endogenized. This gives rise to an asymmetry between the two sides: price competition on
5A major purpose of many studies is to investigate the equilibrium and welfare consequences of platform com-
petition. Since our paper deals only with a monopoly platform, we will focus on the monopoly part of the major
papers in our review of the literature. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) suggested that an entrant intermediation service
provider may successfully challenge an incumbent by charging a low membership fee to win the competition, while
charging a high transaction fee to make profit. Similarly, when two platforms compete for multi-sided users with
sequential pricing, Jullien (2011) demonstrated that the second mover can always find some weaker fronts in the first
mover’s pricing and win these customers with subsidies. Rysman (2009) surveyed many issues of two-sided platforms
including pricing, price competition, openness, and public policy.
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the seller side and free-riding problem on the buyer side. As a result of the asymmetry, a larger
number of buyers intensifies seller competition, which in turn makes it more valuable for a buyer
to stay off the platform.
One way to generate asymmetry is to introduce same-side network effect to a particular side.
Some of the seminal papers mentioned above have briefly discussed the possibility of introducing
the same-side effect.6 In a recent work, Hagiu (2009) assumes that each seller’s surplus decreases
with the number of sellers. He finds that when consumers have stronger preference for variety,
a platform increasingly relies on the seller side in generating revenue. While Hagiu looks at the
distribution of total revenues between the two sides, we focus on per-user charges. In his model
each consumer buys every product on the platform, so seller competition is not as fierce as in our
location model, where each buyer buys only one product.
Some papers have explored other consequences of same-side rivalry. Ellison and Fudenberg
(2003) and Ellison et al. (2004) both show that when platforms compete, negative same-side effect
may serve as a counter force to the increasing returns effect that favors concentration. As a result,
it is possible to have two active platforms coexisting in equilibrium. Belleflamme and Toulemonde
(2009) show that when same-side negative externalities are either very strong or very weak relative
to the cross-side positive externalities, a new platform can win customers from an existing platform
with fees and subsidies. Lin et al. (2011) allow vertically differentiated sellers to compete on the
platform and find that subsidizing buyers may be optimal if the buyers’ willingness to pay for
quality is sufficiently dispersed, as more variation in the buyers’ quality preferences can mitigate
the seller competition and enable the platform to generate revenues on the seller side.
3 Model Setup
Three types of players make decisions in this game: (the owner of) a platform, N potential sellers,
and z potential buyers. Sellers offer products that buyers desire, but the two groups must use
the platform to trade. The platform charges each seller and buyer an entry fee, denoted as Rs
and Rb, respectively.
7 In addition to the entry fees, sellers and buyers incur entry costs. Buyers
6Rochet and Tirole (2006, p.664): “the independence of Bi relative to N i excludes same-side externalities. Con-
sider for example a software platform with NS application developers and NB consumers. Then, BS = bS(NS)NB ,
with b˙S < 0 if the applications are substitutes (rivalry effects) and b˙S > 0 if the applications are complements.” Arm-
strong (2006): “In some contexts, there are intragroup externalities present, and a group-2 agent might be better off
if there were fewer other group-2 agents on the same platform, in which case the formula (24) is not valid.” (p.679).
“A plausible hypothesis is: platforms will allow competition within the platform if consumers can be charged for
entry, but if for exogenous reasons consumers have free entry, then platforms will restrict competition to drive up the
revenues obtained from retailers.” (p.686).
7A more general pricing scheme, which is also very common in practice, is two-part tariff. In our model, however,
buyers are assumed to have unit demand, in which case a two-part tariff is equivalent to a lump sum entry fee. In
other words, our model is set up in such a way that the platform displays membership externality but not usage
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are heterogeneous in the entry cost, c, which follows a uniform distribution on [0, C]. We assume
that all sellers have the same entry cost, f .8 Entry fees and entry costs differ in three aspects.
First, entry fee is a transfer payment between a user and the platform, whereas entry cost is a
deadweight loss, to the three parties combined. Second, entry fees are endogenous and chosen by
the platform, whereas entry costs are exogenous. Third, unlike positive entry costs, the entry fees
can be negative, which suggests a subsidy provided by the platform.9 Assume that the platform
incurs a constant marginal cost in serving each buyer, and another constant marginal cost in serving
each seller. Given that the two costs are constant, we may normalize them both to zero without
any loss of generality. Under such normalization, a subsidy (i.e., a negative entry fee) simply means
a below-cost entry fee.
Each seller offers only one product; thus, seller and product are conceptually equivalent, and
seller heterogeneity and vertical differentiation are interchangeable. Products are assumed to differ
both horizontally and vertically, which is modeled by introducing quality heterogeneity to Salop’s
(1979) circle. Horizontal differentiation is then represented by sellers’ locations on the circle, while
vertical differentiation is represented by quality heterogeneity among these sellers. Each seller’s
quality is modeled as an independent draw from an identical distribution on [v, v] with mean µ and
variance σ2.
The game unfolds in three stages (Figure 1). In stage I, the platform sets the two entry
fees Rs and Rb. In stage II, before qualities are realized, sellers and buyers simultaneously make
entry decisions by paying their respective entry fees and incurring entry costs. Here we assume
that sellers are uncertain about their quality before entering the platform. Many reasons, such
as the serendipitous nature of R&D and unpredictable business environment, may lead to such
uncertainties. Upon entry, sellers are located equidistantly based on a common expectation of
quality,10 and buyers are assigned uniformly on the circle. In stage III, sellers’ quality levels are
externality (Armstrong 2006, Rochet and Tirole 2006). Rochet and Tirole (2006, p.651) have pointed out the relevance
of membership externalities in many cases.
8Heterogeneous entry cost on the buyer side is assumed to ensure an interior solution of buyer entry scale, which
will then adjust marginally as the buyer entry fee changes. Such heterogeneity is unnecessary on the seller side
because a seller’s expected profit decreases as more sellers enter the platform, which leads to an interior entry scale
on the seller side even if their entry costs are identical, which we assume for simplicity. If sellers also differ in their
entry costs, our findings continue to hold.
9Examples of entry fee may include the annual subscription fee the smartphone application developers pay to the
application market owner (e.g., Apple) and the price of the smartphone paid by the users. When subsidizing the
users, the platform sets the price of the smartphones such that they are sold at a loss. Entry cost can include learning
cost. Application developers often incur learning cost when creating applications for a certain type of technology;
similarly, users also face learning cost when adopting a new device.
10Typically, product features are determined first, and they reflect sellers’ locations on the circle upon entry. Quality
is revealed later after product is developed and introduced to the market. If product quality is known before entry,
sellers may pay identical or different entry fees depending on the platform’s information about each seller’s quality
and its capability of price discrimination. Furthermore, there is the question of how to model the location choice by
heterogeneous sellers. All these issues are orthogonal to and non-essential for the questions that we study. For this
8
Figure 1: Timeline of the Game
realized and become public information, based on which the two sides trade. Sellers compete by
setting prices, and buyers have unit demand. Buyer j receives surplus vi − pi − tdij by purchasing
from seller i that has quality vi and sets price pi; dij is the distance between buyer j and seller i,
and t is buyers’ unit transportation cost. The distance can be interpreted as the degree of misfit
between the buyer’s horizontal preference and the seller’s product. To ensure that all sellers obtain
a positive market share (i.e., every seller sells to some buyers), we assume v − v < tN , which is
consistent with the condition for localized competition in Alderighi and Piga (2012) and Lin and
Wu (2015).
4 Analysis
We solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction.
4.1 Stage III: Trading
We analyze the equilibrium trading decisions, taking the number of sellers and buyers who enter
the platform, ns and nb, as given. We will focus on the equilibrium in which market is fully covered
(i.e., every buyer buys from some seller). Without loss of generality, let the location of the ith seller
reason, we assume that quality is realized only after entry has taken place and locations have been chosen. This is a
typical way of dealing with entry issues when users are uncertain about their herterogeneous trading surplus, and is
widely used in the literature. See, for example, Ellison et al (2004), and Rochet and Tirole (2006, p.661).
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be ins for i = 0, 1, · · · , ns − 1. A buyer at location x is indifferent between buying from either of
the two nearest sellers indexed by i and i+ 1, if vi−pi− t(x− ins ) = vi+1−pi+1− t
(
i+1
ns
− x
)
. The
location of the marginal buyer is then solved as x∗i,i+1 =
(vi−pi)−(vi+1−pi+1)
2t +
i
ns
+ 12ns . Similarly, the
location of the marginal buyer between sellers i and i− 1 is x∗i−1,i = (vi−1−pi−1)−(vi−pi)2t + i−1ns + 12ns .
Then seller i’s quantity sold is:
qi = nb(x
∗
i,i+1 − x∗i−1,i) = nb
[
1
2t
(2vi − vi+1 − vi−1 − 2pi + pi+1 + pi−1) + 1
ns
]
.
Given that seller i’s revenue is pii = qipi, the first-order condition (FOC) with respect to pi gives,
pi =
2vi − (vi+1 − pi+1)− (vi−1 − pi−1)
4
+
t
2ns
.
From here, we obtain qi = nb
[
2vi−(vi+1−pi+1)−(vi−1−pi−1)
2t +
1
ns
− pit
]
= nbpit .
The optimal price of seller i depends on the prices charged by its two neighboring sellers, i− 1
and i + 1. In equilibrium, the prices of all ns sellers must be solved simultaneously. Closed-form
solution of the equilibrium price is derived as follows.
Lemma 1 Given the number of buyers and sellers and the realization of qualities of all sellers, the
equilibrium price for seller i is
p∗i =
t
ns
+ vi −
ns−1∑
j=0
bjvi−j , (1)
where bj =
δns−j+δj√
3(δns−1) and δ = 2 +
√
3. Seller i’s equilibrium quantity is then qi =
nb
t p
∗
i and revenue
is pii =
nb
t p
∗2
i .
Proof. The proof of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 are collected in the technical appendix. All the other
proofs can be found at the end of this paper.
4.2 Stage II: Entry
Seller i’s expected profit from entering the platform is E(pii)−Rs − f , where E(pii) is its expected
trading surplus (or expected revenue) gross of the entry fee and entry cost. For simplicity, we refer
to E(pii) as a seller’s expected surplus in the rest of the paper. Since all sellers are ex ante identical,
they have equal expected surplus, denoted by E(pi).
Lemma 2 A seller’s expected surplus is:
E(pi) =
nb
t
[
t2
n2s
+
σ2
ns
gs(ns)
]
, (2)
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where gs(ns) = ns
(
1− 4
3
√
3
δns+1
δns−1 +
2ns
3
δns
(δns−1)2
)
> 0. The seller surplus displays a positive cross-
side network effect from buyers to sellers (i.e., ∂E(pi)∂nb > 0), and a negative same-side network effect
among sellers (i.e., ∂E(pi)∂ns < 0).
Two-sided markets are characterized by cross-side network effect, i.e., greater participation on
one side increases the surplus of participating on the other side. Such effect is given exogenously
in most studies. Here, we generate it endogenously by modeling the two sides’ trading decisions.
The endogenization also reveals something that is missing in many studies: A negative same-side
network effect arises among sellers, as a seller’s expected surplus decreases when more sellers enter
the platform. In reality, many two-sided markets involve price competition among sellers, so seller
rivalry is inevitable. As will be clear later, this negative same-side network effect plays a crucial role
in the asymmetry between sellers and buyers and, therefore, in the platform’s pricing strategies.
If buyer j enters the platform, her expected payoff is E(u)−Rb− cj , where cj is her entry cost,
and E(u) is her expected surplus from trading on the platform, with the expectation taken on her
location and the product quality of the seller from whom she makes the purchase.
Lemma 3 A buyer’s expected surplus is:
E(u) = µ− 5t
4ns
+
σ2
t
gb(ns), (3)
where gb(ns) = ns
(
1
6
√
3
δns+1
δns−1 − ns3 δ
ns
(δns−1)2
)
> 0. The buyer surplus displays a positive cross-side
network effect from sellers to buyers (i.e., ∂E(u)∂ns > 0), but no direct same-side network effect exists
among buyers (i.e., ∂E(u)∂nb = 0).
A buyer’s surplus increases with the number of sellers, indicating a positive cross-side network
effect in the reverse direction of that in Lemma 2. The manifestation of positive cross-side network
effects in both directions echoes the standard network effect assumptions. However, unlike the
usual assumption, the effect is non-linear, indicating that the cross-side network effect cannot be
captured by one single parameter. Rather, it depends endogenously on a whole set of parameters in
a non-linear fashion, which in turn would directly affect the platform’s optimal pricing strategies.
Also note that the buyer surplus is independent of the number of buyers, showing no direct same-
side network effect among buyers. This property is a direct consequence of our assumption of
constant production cost by the sellers, so that when more buyers enter the circle, each seller
simply increases its quantity supplied without having to raise the equilibrium price. In reality,
rivalry among buyers may not exist (consider the example of yellow page users); even when it does,
is usually less severe than that among sellers. There are also many cases of positive network effect
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among buyers (Katz and Shapiro 1985), e.g., networked video games, group-buying, and customer
reviews. Such positive network effect among buyers is likely to only further sharpen the asymmetry
between sellers and buyers.
Because gs(ns) > 0 and gb(ns) > 0, direct inspection of Eq. (2) and (3) reveals:
Corollary 1 ∂E(pi)
∂σ2
> 0 and ∂E(u)
∂σ2
> 0; that is, an increase in quality variation leads to higher
surplus for both sellers and buyers.
The corollary says that quality heterogeneity benefits both sellers and buyers. Fixing the
number of users on the two sides, increased quality variation allows the higher-quality sellers to
gain additional market share and charge higher prices; the opposite applies to the lower-quality
sellers. Since the number of transactions made at a lower price is reduced, and those made at a
higher price are raised, the total profit gain overweighs the total profit loss. Therefore, a seller’s
expected surplus increases with quality variation (i.e., gs(ns) > 0). Buyers’ expected surplus also
increases. Fixing the seller in a transaction, the buyer’s expected surplus is not affected by the
degree of quality variation. However, quality variation can enable a buyer to switch to a different
seller in her equilibrium choice and raise her expected surplus. When quality varies more, switching
is more likely, thus a buyer’s expected surplus is higher (i.e., gb(ns) > 0).
The significance of Corollary 1 is to highlight the fact that some parameters may affect the two
sides’ surplus simultaneously. This would pose a particular challenge to the platform’s two-sided
pricing strategies: When σ2 is larger so that both buyer surplus and seller surplus are greater, does
the platform raise the entry fees on both sides? We will address this issue in Section 6.
Having derived sellers’ and buyers’ expected trading surplus, we are now ready to analyze the
two sides’ entry decisions. A seller enters the platform as long as his expected profit is non-negative.
Therefore, the equilibrium number of the sellers on the platform, ns, must satisfy the free-entry
condition, E(pi)−Rs − f = 0, or
Rs(ns, nb) =
nb
t
[
t2
n2s
+
σ2
ns
gs(ns)
]
− f. (4)
A buyer with entry cost cj enters the platform if and only if her expected payoff is non-negative:
E(u) − Rb − cj ≥ 0, or equivalently cj ≤ E(u) − Rb. If the equilibrium number of buyer entering
the platform is nb, the marginal buyer must have an entry cost of cb =
C
z nb given the uniform
distribution of cj . As a result, Rb = E(u)− cb, or
Rb(ns, nb) = µ− 5t
4ns
+
σ2
t
gb(ns)− C
z
nb. (5)
The two equations, (4) and (5), can be viewed as the demand function on the two sides, in the
same spirit as in Armstrong (2006).
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4.3 Stage I: Platform Pricing
The platform chooses Rs and Rb to maximize its total profit Π = nsRs + nbRb. Mathematically,
this is equivalent to choosing ns and nb, with Rs and Rb being expressed as functions of ns and nb
as in Eq. (4) and (5). Then the platform’s optimization problem becomes:
max
ns,nb
Π(ns, nb) = nsRs(ns, nb) + nbRb(ns, nb). (6)
The FOCs with respect to ns and nb are:
∂Π
∂ns
= R∗s + ns
∂Rs
∂ns
+ nb
∂Rb
∂ns
= 0, (7)
∂Π
∂nb
= R∗b + nb
∂Rb
∂nb
+ ns
∂Rs
∂nb
= 0. (8)
Assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied and that a unique solution exists for the two
equations.
5 Subsidy and Liquidity
In this section, we examine the platform’s pricing strategies, in particular the conditions under
which the platform subsidizes the entry of either side. Consider Eq. (7), which captures the effect
on the platform’s profit by admitting one more seller when the buyer-side entry scale is fixed. The
effect consists of three parts. First, the platform can collect an entry fee from the newly admitted
seller, R∗s (which is negative if sellers are being subsidized). Second, to admit this additional
seller, the platform must lower the seller entry fee, which applies to all existing sellers given the
assumption that the platform cannot discriminate among sellers (ns
∂Rs
∂ns
< 0). We call this the same-
side loss (SSL), which is the platform’s loss of revenues on the side of additional entry. Third, all
buyers benefit from the increased number of sellers; thus, the platform can raise the buyer-side fee
(nb
∂Rb
∂ns
> 0) without losing any buyers. This is termed the cross-side gain (CSG), which is the
platform’s gain of revenues on the side across from the side of the additional entry. When the seller
entry scale is optimal, the three effects must add up to zero. Therefore, the platform subsidizes
sellers (i.e., R∗s < 0) if and only if the same-side loss from the sellers is outweighed by the cross-side
gain from the buyers. Similarly, the platform subsidizes buyers (i.e., R∗b < 0) if and only if the
same-side loss from the buyers is outweighed by the cross-side gain from the sellers.
We now derive the specific conditions for subsidizing sellers and buyers. Given the complex forms
of gs(ns) and gb(ns), approximation is needed to simplify these expressions to achieve analytical
tractability.11 Let δ2 = 1− 43√3 , δ3 =
1
6
√
3
, and δ1 = δ2 + δ3 = 1− 76√3 . Then with approximation,
11When ns is not too small,
δns+1
δns−1 ≈ 1 and nsδ
ns
(δns−1)2 ≈ 0 (recall that δ = 2 +
√
3 ≈ 3.73). See Appendix B for
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E(pi) ≈ nbt
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
and E(u) ≈ µ − 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns. Given that Rs = E(pi) − f and Rb =
E(u)− Cz nb, the platform’s profit function, Π = nsRs + nbRb, becomes
Π = nbµ− t
4
nb
ns
+ δ1
σ2
t
nsnb − nsf − C
z
n2b . (9)
The two first-order conditions are derived:
∂Π
∂ns
≡ 0 leads to nb = 4ftn
2
s
t2 + 4δ1σ2n2s
, (10)
∂Π
∂nb
≡ 0 leads to nb = z
8tC
4δ1σ
2n2s + 4µtns − t2
ns
. (11)
We are now ready to report the first major result of our paper:
Proposition 1 The platform subsidizes sellers’ entry (R∗s < 0) if and only if
Ctf
z
< σ2(δ5µ+ δ6σ), (12)
where δ5 and δ6 are positive constants. The platform subsidizes buyers’ entry (R
∗
b < 0) if and only
if
Ctf
z
> δ7 (µ+ θ) (µ− δ8θ)(µ− δ9θ), (13)
where θ =
√
µ2 − 9δ3σ2, and δ7, δ8, and δ9 are also positive constants.
The proposition identifies a sufficient and necessary condition for subsidizing sellers and that
for subsidizing buyers. These conditions imply that seller subsidy is more likely if entry on either
side is less costly (C or f is lower), buyers have weaker horizontal preferences (t is lower), more
potential buyers are in the market (z is higher), the products have higher average quality (µ is
higher), or they have greater quality variation (σ2 is higher).12 All these characteristics describe
a liquid market, which we define as a setting where interactions on the platform generate a large
total surplus so that many buyers and sellers enter the platform in equilibrium. Conversely, buyer
subsidy is more likely under the opposite conditions, corresponding to an illiquid market where
few buyers and sellers enter the platform in equilibrium. Proposition 1 states that the platform
should subsidize sellers when facing a sufficiently liquid market, and subsidize buyers when facing
a sufficiently illiquid market.
more details. Numerical calculations indicate that there is virtually no loss of accuracy from approximation in the
derivation of the results. Also note that since gs(ns) and gb(ns) are coefficients of σ
2, the approximation makes little
difference if σ2 is small.
12We can show that the right hand side of Conditions (12) and (13) increases with both µ and σ2. For the impact
of the transportation unit cost, t, note that t measures the mismatch between a seller’s product and its buyers’
horizontal preference and is, therefore, a deadweight loss to the transactions. A weaker horizontal preference (in the
sense of a smaller t) means greater surpluses for both buyers and sellers.
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To understand the intuition, recall that users on one side is subsidized if and only if the same-
side loss (SSL) from admitting one more user on that side is outweighed by the cross-side gain
(CSG). In a liquid market with many sellers and many buyers, seller competition is sufficiently
intense, such that it does not further intensify substantially if the platform brings in one more
seller. Therefore, admitting another seller will result in a relatively small SSL from the seller side
when many sellers already are on the platform. Meanwhile, the entry of the additional seller benefits
every buyer through intensified seller competition. Because all buyers receive the benefit, the total
CSG tends to be large when there are many buyers. In such a liquid market, therefore, bringing
in an additional seller tends to generates a CSG that is greater than the SSL, which means the
platform should subsidize sellers.
Now consider the opposite case of an illiquid market with few buyers and sellers. Since an
additional buyer has no direct impact on the other buyers, the platform does not need to lower the
buyer fee substantially. In other words, the SSL from the reduction in the buyer fee is less severe if
fewer buyers are on the platform. At the same time, the CSG is greater if there are fewer sellers, as
their competition is less intense, which helps to generate greater gains from the increased number
of buyers. Therefore, in a more illiquid market, it is more likely for the additional buyer to generate
a CSG that is greater than the SSL, which means it is optimal for the platform to subsidize buyers.
Proposition 1 highlights the connection between the platform’s subsidy policy and market liq-
uidity. At the root of the connection is the fundamental asymmetry between sellers and buyers:
rivalry exists among sellers, but not among buyers. Intense seller competition leads to higher
buyer-side surplus; mitigated seller competition helps to generate seller-side surplus. To subsidize
any side, the platform must expect to more than recover the subsidies by gaining from the opposite
side. In a liquid market with many sellers and many buyers, the platform mainly relies on the buyer
side to generate its revenue. Then subsidizing sellers makes sense, as the expanded seller network
benefits the buyers. And the same applies conversely.
The conditions for subsidizing sellers and buyers are clearly reversed: An increase in any of
the six parameters is conducive to the subsidy of one side, and hinders the subsidy of the other
side. Such asymmetry is curious because the well-known insight, that a platform is more inclined
to subsidize the side that exerts a stronger cross-side network effect (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005,
Armstrong 2006), does not distinguish between the two sides. When the magnitude of the network
effect is endogenous, as in our model, any change in a parameter can alter the network effects on
both sides. In that case, the previous findings based on relative network effects are ambiguous. In
contrast, we are able to arrive at a definite conclusion through the endogenization. Our results also
highlight the asymmetry between the two sides. This asymmetry can be traced to the negative
same-side network effect resulting from sellers’ price competition, which is not accounted for in
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many earlier works. To the extent that buyers usually exhibit a weaker degree of rivalry than
sellers, we expect the asymmetry and the resulting connection between market liquidity and the
platform’s subsidy strategies to hold in a more general setting.
Due to the very nature of two-sidedness, whenever a condition encourages entry on one side, it
is also conducive to the entry on the other side. It is therefore non-trivial to show that a parameter
change, which moves the two sides’ entry scales in the same direction, always causes their subsidies
to move in opposite directions. Consider, for example, the role of entry costs in the platform’s
subsidy strategies. One may expect subsidy to mitigate the friction from entry cost, that is, an
increase in the entry cost of any side should pull the optimality of subsidy to that side. That
indeed would be the prediction when the network effect or demand elasticity is exogenous: A
greater entry cost on one side tends to increase that side’s demand elasticity, making it more likely
for the platform to subsidize that side. An increase in the two sides’ entry costs should therefore
have opposite effects on the platform’s subsidy choices. In contrast, we find that buyer and seller
entry cost play the same role in the platform’s subsidization strategy. A higher entry cost on either
side encourages buyer subsidy, and a lower entry cost on either side encourages seller subsidy. Such
result can be easily understood through the lens of liquidity. Entry costs on both sides have a
consistent impact on the network size of the platform: When either cost is higher, the equilibrium
entry scale on both sides shrinks, and the market becomes less liquid.
The subsidy conditions have been expressed in Eq. (12) and (13). They can be rearranged to
highlight the role of σ2 in relation to other parameters:13
Proposition 2 The platform’s subsidy strategies depend on quality heterogeneity in the following
way:
(1) There exists a unique σs
(
µ, Ctfz
)
> 0 such that sellers are subsidized if and only if σ > σs.
Furthermore, σs decreases with µ and increases with
Ctf
z .
(2) If Ctfz ≤ 16729µ3, then buyers are never subsidized for any σ. If Ctfz > 16729µ3, then there
exists a unique σb
(
µ, Ctfz
)
> 0 such that buyers are subsidized if and only if σ < σb. Furthermore,
σb decreases with µ and increases with
Ctf
z .
Proposition 2 says that quality variation is conducive to seller subsidy but hinders buyer subsidy.
In particular, given any set of parameters C, t, f , z, and µ, the platform subsidizes sellers if and only
if the quality variation is sufficiently large. The flip side is that the platform never subsidizes sellers
if the quality varies little, including the case of no vertical differentiation (σ2 = 0). Conversely, the
platform subsidizes buyers only if the quality variation is sufficiently low. Note that some additional
13The coefficient 16
729
in statement (2) is due to peculiar features of price competition on a circular city with quality
variation.
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conditions are needed for buyer subsidy. Even with zero quality variation, buyer subsidy would not
be optimal unless the average product quality µ is sufficiently low and/or the entry and transaction
are sufficiently costly (C, t, and f cannot be too low).
Figure 2: Subsidization Conditions in the σ2-µ Space
Figure 2 demonstrates the results in Proposition 2 in the σ2-µ space and completely captures
how each of the six parameters affects the subsidy condition of either side. The two solid lines
indicate the combinations of σ2 and µ for which buyers are subsidized (the lower left corner), sellers
are subsidized (the upper right corner), or neither group is subsidized (the area in the middle). It
is clear that a higher σ2 and/or µ is conducive to seller subsidy and hinders buyer subsidy. As
indicated in Proposition 2, the remaining four parameters affect the subsidy conditions through a
composite variable, Ctfz . The dotted lines in Figure 2 show how
Ctf
z affects the boundary of the
σ2-µ combination: A greater Ctfz shifts both boundaries to northeast, meaning that a greater z is
conducive to seller subsidy, while a greater C, t, or f is conducive to buyer subsidy.
To highlight the connection between the platform’s subsidy strategies and the underlying pa-
rameters and to make our results more useful for practitioners, we derive the comparative statics
results based on Propositions 1 and 2 and report them in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Seller-side subsidy is more likely when
1. entry on either side is less costly (C or f is lower);
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2. buyers’ horizontal preferences are weaker (t is lower);
3. more potential buyers are present (z is higher);
4. the average quality is higher (µ is higher), or
5. sellers differ more in quality (σ2 is higher).
Buyer-side subsidy is more likely under the opposite conditions.
6 Quality Heterogeneity, Liquidity, and Platform Pricing
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that the platform’s subsidy strategy depends crucially
on market liquidity. In this section, we will further investigate the role of liquidity in the platform’s
general pricing strategy. That is, instead of finding the conditions that result in a negative fee on
either side, we focus on how liquidity affects the two fees regardless of whether they are positive
or negative. Recall that liquidity captures the impacts of the six parameters in our model: the
entry cost on each side (C and f), the potential buyer market size (z), buyers’ horizontal preference
(t), the average seller quality (µ), and quality heterogeneity (σ2). Of particular interest is quality
heterogeneity as represented by σ2. Unlike most other parameters, σ2 directly affects the two sides
simultaneously, which poses a particular challenge on the comparison between the two sides. We will
formally establish the connection between σ2 and market liquidity as reflected in the equilibrium
entry scale on both sides. We then proceed to investigate how σ2 affects platform pricing. Further
investigation of the remaining five parameters reveals that all parameters affect platform pricing
through their impacts on liquidity.
6.1 Quality Heterogeneity and Liquidity
We now examine how σ2 affects the equilibrium entry scales, ns and nb. Figure 3 illustrates the
entry scales on the two sides in the ns-nb space. Recall the platform’s two FOCs in Eq. (10) and
(11), which are reproduced here: nb =
4ftn2s
t2+4δ1σ2n2s
(derived from ∂Π∂ns ≡ 0, and the curve is denoted
as Πs in Figure 3) and nb =
z
8tC
4δ1σ2n2s+4µtns−t2
ns
(derived from ∂Π∂nb ≡ 0, and the curve is denoted
as Πb). Figure 3 shows the two conditions (for any given level of σ
2) as two solid lines, where Πs
represents the optimal choice of ns for any arbitrary nb, while Πb represents the optimal choice
of nb for any arbitrary ns. The intersection of the two lines gives the platform’s optimal choice
of ns and nb. Both lines are upward sloping, which is to be expected for two-sided markets, as
the platform will optimally choose to expand one side if the other side is larger. Furthermore, the
second-order condition ensures that Πs is steeper than Πb. Now consider the impact of an increase
in σ2. Eq. (10) and (11) show that a greater σ2 lowers Πs and raises Πb. The dotted lines in Figure
3 represent the entry scales at higher σ2.
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Figure 3: Impact of σ2 on the Platform’s Optimal Choices of ns and nb
Immediately we conclude:
Proposition 3 dn
∗
s
dσ2
> 0 and
dn∗b
dσ2
> 0; that is, the equilibrium ns and nb both increase with σ
2.
The proposition says that greater quality variation induces the platform to allow more buyers
and more sellers to enter.14 Intuitively, when product quality varies more, both sellers and buyers
benefit if the entry scales on both sides remain unchanged (Corollary 1). Fixing the buyer entry
scale, the platform should optimally expand the seller entry scale (Πs shifts to the right). Fixing
the seller entry scale, the platform should optimally expand the buyer entry scale (Πb shifts up).
Combining the two effects, the platform will expand the entry scale of both sides. That is, a greater
variation in product quality increases market liquidity.
Using the same method, we can easily show that ns and nb both increase with µ, and both
14The result that
dn∗s
dσ2
> 0 can also be understood as the relationship between vertical and horizontal product
differentiation. In our model, the degree of vertical differentiation is represented by σ2; the degree of horizontal
differentiation is captured by the distance between neighboring sellers, 1
n∗s
, so that a higher number of equilibrium
sellers implies a lower degree of horizontal differentiation. Note that the degree of vertical differentiation is exogenous,
whereas the degree of horizontal differentiation is endogenously determined by the platform’s pricing strategy. Then
the finding of
dn∗s
dσ2
> 0 implies that when sellers are more differentiated vertically, the platform admits more sellers,
which reduces horizontal differentiation. Therefore, the vertical and horizontal dimensions of differentiation are
substitutes in equilibrium.
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decrease with t, f and Cz , so the market becomes more liquid when µ or z increases, and becomes
less liquid when t, f or C increases.
6.2 Liquidity and Entry Fees
We now analyze how the liquidity parameters affect the optimal entry fees, with a particular focus
on quality heterogeneity. The following proposition states the second major result of our paper.
Proposition 4 As quality heterogeneity (σ2) increases, the platform reduces the seller fee (R∗s)
and raises the buyer fee (R∗b).
Proposition 4 anchors strongly on the two-sided feature of the model. Recall that Rs =
nb
t
(
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
)
− f and Rb = µ − 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns − Cz nb. A greater σ2 allows the platform to
raise both Rs and Rb for fixed ns and nb. Intuition may suggest that in equilibrium when ns and nb
are chosen optimally, the platform should still raise both Rs and Rb, albeit by smaller amounts. To
see this, note that Rs(ns) =
nb
t
(
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
)
−f can be regarded as the seller-side demand function.
When σ2 is larger, the demand curve as a function of ns moves up, so the optimal Rs should be
higher. Similarly, a greater σ2 moves up the buyer-side demand Rb(nb) = µ− 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns − Cz nb,
and the platform should raise Rb. These arguments conform to the well established principle that
a (one-sided) monopolist should adjust its pricing such that it shares with its customers the benefit
or burden brought by a changing parameter. Such thinking, however, is flawed, as it treats the two
sides separately. The very spirit of two-sided market is the connection between the two sides. Once
this connection is accounted for, Proposition 4 demonstrates that in response to greater quality
variation, the platform raises the buyer fee but reduces the seller fee.
The intuition can be understood as follows. Increased quality variation affects the two sides’
surplus through both a direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effect is that, fixing the
number of sellers and buyers, both sides benefit from the increase in quality heterogeneity. The
indirect effect is that increased quality variation induces the platform to attract more sellers and
more buyers (Proposition 3), which tends to reduce the sellers’ surplus but raise the buyers’ surplus.
On the buyer side, the two effects are both positive; thus, the platform raises the buyer fee. On
the seller side, the two effects are in opposite directions. In the complex interactions between the
two sides, the indirect effect dominates, so the platform reduces the seller fee.
To better understand the intuition and put the above result in perspective, we have also analyzed
the impacts of the remaining five parameters (Table 1). We find that in equilibrium, the seller fee
Rs increases in t, C, and f , and decreases in z and µ. The exact opposite holds for the buyer
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Table 1: Comparative Statics
Parameter ns nb Rs Rb nsRs nbRb
nsRs
nbRb
σ2 + + − + − + −
t − − + − + − +
µ + + − + − + −
C − − + − + − +
f − − + − + − +
z + + − + − + −
fee Rb.
15 Out of the six parameters, four (C, f , z, µ) exert a direct effect on a single side. For
instance, a higher C clearly reduces the buyers’ surplus, whereas a higher µ raises the buyers’
surplus. Given that Rb = µ− 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns − Cz nb, when ns and nb are both fixed, the direct effect
is that Rb decreases in C and increases in z and µ. It seems intuitive to hypothesize (which is also
the standard intuition for one-sided monopoly) that the platform’s optimal strategy is to raise the
fee on the side where the parameter has a positive direct effect; or vice versa. According to Table
1, this is true for C, z, and µ. However, such a hypothesis cannot explain the impact of σ2, which
affects both sides simultaneously. Look at the expressions of Rb and Rs. Apparently the direct
impact of σ2 is to raise both Rb and Rs, so the hypothesis would have suggested that the platform
should optimally raise both fees, and yet our Proposition 4 has shown that the platform should
raise the buyer fee but reduce the seller fee. More strikingly, such hypothesis fails when applied to
f . Given Rs =
nb
t
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
− f , the direct effect of an increased f is to reduce Rs. However, we
find the opposite: When f is higher, the platform raises Rs and reduces Rb in its optimal strategy.
The resolution for the incoherence of the hypothesis is the following: The platform should be
“side-blind” about a parameter’s direct effect and focus on how a parameter affects the total surplus
from both sides as expressed in Eq. (9). The platform should raise the buyer fee (and reduce the
seller fee) if and only if a parameter directly raises the total surplus, regardless of through which
particular side it exerts such an impact. For example, a greater z, µ, or σ2 all serve to raise the two
sides’ total surplus directly, and indeed the platform raises the buyer fee and lowers the seller fee
in response to an increase in any of the three parameters. And the converse applies for a greater
15In other words, whenever one side’s entry fee increases, the other side’s fee decreases. This confirms the “seesaw
principle” discussed in Rochet and Tirole (2006).
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t, C, or f , which all serve to reduce the total surplus directly.16 When a parameter increases the
total surplus directly, the platform admits more buyers and more sellers under its optimal pricing
strategy. Greater seller competition tends to reduce each seller’s surplus, whereas no such rivalry
exists on the buyer side. As a result, the platform relies increasingly on the buyer side to generate
its revenue, which means the platform should raise the buyer fee and lower the seller fee.
In sum, two forces are at work: the interconnection between the two sides, and the same-side
negative network effect among the sellers. Regardless of the source of a parameter change, as long as
it (directly) raises the two sides’ total surplus, the platform will expand the entry scale on both sides
and increasingly focus on the buyer side by raising the buyer fee and lowering the seller fee. And
the principle discussed here is consistent with the one governing the subsidy policy as highlighted
in Proposition 1. This is hardly surprising, as subsidy policy is part of the general pricing strategy.
So the consistent conclusion is: When a market becomes more liquid (as manifested by any of the
six liquidity parameters), the platform should raise the buyer fee and lower the seller fee; seller
subsidy also becomes more likely. Conversely, when a market becomes less liquid, the platform
should raise the seller fee and lower the buyer fee; buyer subsidy becomes more likely.
6.3 Liquidity and Platform Profits
By the Envelope Theorem, it is straightforward to show that the platform’s profit increases as
products become more heterogeneous in quality. Similarly, any parameter change would raise the
platform’s profit if and only if it raises liquidity/total surplus. Therefore, an increase in z, µ and
σ2 would raise the platform’s equilibrium profits, while an increase in t, C or f would reduce
the platform’s equilibrium profits. We also find that as quality variation increases, the platform’s
revenue source shifts away from the seller side and toward the buyer side; that is, n
∗
sR
∗
s
n∗bR
∗
b
, decreases
with σ2. This follows intuitively from our previous results that the platform focuses less on charging
sellers and more on charging buyers at an increased quality variation.
7 Welfare
In the traditional circular city model, Salop had shown that from social perspective, there is too
much entry on the seller side (his buyer side is fixed). In our circular city with two-sided interaction,
a natural question is whether the equilibrium entry on either side is above or below the socially
optimal levels. Our concern is the efficiency of entry into the platform, not the efficiency of sellers’
16A greater t reduces the buyer surplus, but affects the seller surplus in a non-linear way. When t is larger, each
buyer’s net willingness to pay is reduced, which tends to reduce a seller’s surplus, but the price competition between
sellers is also mitigated, which tends to increase a seller’s surplus. For our purpose, however, what matters is how t
affects the two sides’ combined total surplus, and the effect is unambiguous: the total surplus decreases with t.
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pricing in trading. So we will allow a social planner to directly control nb and ns in order to
maximize social welfare without changing the trading equilibrium in stage three. Post entry, we
have calculated each seller’s expected profit as E(pi), and each buyer’s expected surplus as E(u).
Then the post-entry total social surplus is nsE(pi) + nbE(u). The total seller entry cost is nsf .
Given that the number of entrant buyers is nb, the cutoff buyer entry cost must be cb =
nb
z C, so
the total buyer entry cost is
∫ cb
0 cj
z
C dcj =
n2bC
2z . The overall social welfare is therefore
W = nsE(pi) + nbE(u)− nsf − C
2z
n2b .
The platform’s total profit is Π = nsRs + nbRb, with Rs = E(pi) − f , and Rb = E(u) − Cz nb.
That means the platform’s profit function is
Π = nsE(pi) + nbE(u)− nsf − C
z
n2b .
Given that E(pi) = nbt
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
and E(u) = µ − 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns, we have already derived the
platform’s two first-order conditions, which are re-produced here:
∂Π
∂ns
≡ 0 leads to nb = 4ftn
2
s
t2 + 4δ1σ2n2s
, denoted as Πs
∂Π
∂nb
≡ 0 leads to nb = z
8tC
4δ1σ
2n2s + 4µtns − t2
ns
, denoted as Πb
Similarly, for the social planner, the two first-order conditions lead respectively to:
∂W
∂ns
= 0 leads to nb =
4ftn2s
t2 + 4δ1σ2n2s
, denoted as Ws
∂W
∂nb
= 0 leads to nb =
z
4tC
4δ1σ
2n2s + 4µtns − t2
ns
, denoted as Wb
Apparently, Πs = Ws (meaning that given any arbitrary nb, the platform and the social planner
will choose the same optimal ns), and Wb = 2Πb (meaning that given any arbitrary ns, the social
planner’s optimal choice of nb is greater than the platform’s optimal choice). The curves represent-
ing the four FOCs are shown in Figure 4. Since Πs coincides with Ws, there are only three curves
in the graph. All these curves are upward sloping due to the positive cross-side network effect for
both the platform and the social planner. Furthermore, the second-order condition ensures that
Πs and Ws are steeper than either Πb or Wb.
The graph immediately proves:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium entry scale on either side is lower than the socially optimal levels.
The proposition says that the platform’s optimal pricing strategy results in too few sellers and
too few buyers from societal perspective. Intuitively, the platform and the social planner’s objective
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Figure 4: Platform’s and Social Planner’s Optimal Choices
functions largely coincide except for the buyer side’s entry cost: The platform cares about Cz n
2
b
while the social planner cares about C2zn
2
b . This is the typical divergence between a monopolist
who cares about the marginal customer (the entry cost of the marginal buyer is Cz nb), and a social
planner who cares about the average customer (the entry cost of all entrant buyers ranging from 0
to Cz nb). As a result, the platform admits too few buyers. By the very nature of two-sided markets,
a smaller entry scale on the buyer side generates smaller profits for the sellers, so the platform also
admits too few sellers as compared with the socially optimal level.
Economists care about two-sided markets mainly for their impacts on competition. Given
our setting of monopoly platform, this paper is not positioned to study the competition between
platforms. Nevertheless, it sheds some light on the welfare consequence when a monopoly platform
controls both sides’ entry through entry fees. The platform certainly plays a positive role, as it
internalizes the positive cross-side network effects for both sides as well as the negative same-side
network effects for buyers. Our results indicate that under conditions similar to our model setting,
we need not worry too much about inefficient entry due to these externalities. Nevertheless, there
is still a discrepancy between the platform’s incentive and the social incentive, and the inefficiency
stems from heterogeneity of buyers in terms of their entry costs.17
17In our model the sellers are assumed to have identical entry cost. If their entry costs are also heterogeneous, the
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At this point it is helpful to compare our result of under-entry with the celebrated over-entry
result obtained by Salop (1979). Both are based on circular city models. In Salop (1979), the
buyer’s entry scale is fixed exogenously, so sellers do not experience any positive network effect
from buyers. In equilibrium, too many sellers enter in a “tragedy of commons” type of mechanism
due to the negative network externality among sellers. In our model, by contrast, such negative
externality is fully internalized by the monopoly platform as a gatekeeper. Our under-entry result
is driven by the platform’s failure to fully internalize the buyers’ heterogeneous entry costs.
8 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper examines a monopoly platform’s two-sided pricing problem in a setting where positive
cross-side network effects are generated endogenously from buyers’ and sellers’ trading and entry
decisions. Price competition then gives rise to a negative same-side network effect among sellers, so
the two sides are intrinsically asymmetric. We find that the platform’s pricing depends crucially on
market liquidity, an indication of how much total surplus can be generated on the platform by the
two sides’ interactions. When a parameter change causes the market to become more liquid so that
more buyers and more sellers enter the platform in equilibrium, the platform will reduce the seller
entry fee and raise the buyer entry fee in its optimal strategy. Therefore, what matters for platform
pricing is the market’s collective property (i.e., the two sides combined) rather than comparisons
between the two sides, as is the prevailing conclusion of the literature. Our results demonstrate two
major forces in two-sided markets that seem to have received insufficient attention in the literature:
a profound and fundamental interconnection between the two sides, and side asymmetry due to,
say, the two sides’ different degrees of same-side interactions.
These findings provide a new perspective for thinking about platform subsidies. Buyer-side
subsidy is commonly observed in practice, especially when the networks are not large. For example,
Microsoft subsidized Xbox by offering the console at a very low price. Although the strategy may
be designed in part to compete with other console makers, not having high liquidity in the market
of players and game developers allowed Microsoft to recover the consumer-side subsidy from the
game developer side. This supports our result. In contrast to game consoles’ buyer-side subsidy,
computer operating systems often subsidize the sellers (software developers). Microsoft Windows
is known to subsidize developers by offering free or low-cost software development kit (SDK) and
support, while charging high prices on the user side (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Part of the reason may
be that the quality of console games is not as variable as quality of software programs – the quality
of software programs critically depends on developers’ expertise on design and development and,
under-entry problem will be further exacerbated.
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often, industry-specific knowledge. Trade fairs also come close to illustrating this case, including
wedding expos, computer fairs, and many others. Some of these fairs, especially those that are
large in scale and held in central locations (e.g., metropolitan areas) tend to charge an entrance
fee on the buyer side and attract a large crowd nevertheless. Because of easy access for attendees
and low setup costs for vendors, both sides incur low entry costs to participate. These are also
consistent with our findings.
In Section 6, we explore quality heterogeneity in depth and derived a number of important
results, which guide the platform’s strategy in managing sellers’ entry scale. In some cases, platform
owners exercise limited or no control over the degree of quality heterogeneity on the seller side.
For example, as Airbnb expands to serve over 33,000 cities in 192 countries, differences in income
distribution, culture, and government regulations across these regions may create variations in
quality of hosts. Hosts in certain regions might be more consistent in terms of lodging space
quality and hospitality than those in other regions. Our finding suggests that the platform owner
may be better off tailoring the network size of its hosts in different regions for quality heterogeneity
based on regional characteristics. In other cases, the platform has access to various instruments to
influence the outcomes of sellers’ quality. Smartphone platform owners such as Apple and Google
employ various contests and even directly screen applications to craft the distribution of application
qualities. Our finding then offers insights into how platforms might consider balancing the number
of applications while controlling quality variation.18
The findings on the impact of σ2 on the two sides’ entry scale and entry fees also provide a
basis for how the platform can adjust its pricing when market condition changes. For example, if
some smartphone application developers succeed in a particular technology innovation and release
games of superior visual experience or applications that more seamlessly integrate with the oper-
ating system, the newly introduced applications then effectively increase quality variation in the
market. The platform may then consider reducing the fee on the developer side while raising the
price charged on the user side. The same strategy may be implemented in reverse. For instance, if
Airbnb decides to exclude hosts below a certain quality to avoid legal disputes, the reduced quality
variation would suggest a higher fee for the hosts. Given these strategies, the platform can benefit
from including more types of sellers to create a more diverse marketplace. This advises against
mechanisms to screen out lower quality sellers for the sole reason of improving overall seller quality.
Understandably, some platform might still exclude sellers that may lead to other undesirable con-
sequences (e.g., by reviewing applications for security or adverse selection problems). Our result
18Strictly speaking, in these cases the platform’s control over quality would affect both the average quality µ and
the quality variation σ2; thus, our conclusions regarding the impact of σ2 with fixed µ may require reinterpretation
before they can be applied. This adjustment may be straightforward, at least for some specific functional forms of
the quality distribution.
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raises cautions regarding such exclusion and suggests an evaluation of screening criteria to avoid
unintended narrowing of quality variation among sellers.
In sum, our research generates a number of predictions by linking at least six parameters to
a platform’s pricing strategies. All these are empirically testable and directly useful to managers.
We have considered a setting with asymmetry between the two sides using same-same interaction
among the sellers. It is interesting to consider other ways to generate side asymmetry. Another
direction of future research is to extend the endogenization to competing platforms, which is nec-
essary for understanding most business phenomena in real life as well as deriving useful antitrust
policies. Also, platforms may be able to strategically inform buyers of sellers’ products to reduce
information asymmetry in the interaction between the two sides. For example, platforms’ invest-
ments in technologies that improve buyers’ shopping interface, facilitate product recommendations,
or empower product search are instrumental for determining information and trading surplus for
both sides. Endogenizing the related variables can be a fruitful direction.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
In the text we formulate the platform’s optimization problem as choosing ns and nb simulta-
neously. In deriving the subsidy conditions, it is easier to turn the optimization problem into a
sequential choice. To do this, we first use the first-order condition (10) to arrive at nb =
4ftn2s
t2+4δ1σ2n2s
,
and then plug this expression into the platform’s objective function. The platform will then solve
the following optimization problem:
max
ns
Π(ns) =
z
4C
(
µ− t
4ns
+
σ2
t
δ1ns
)2
− nsf, (14)
for which the FOC is,
Π′(ns) =
z
2C
(
µ− t
4ns
+
σ2
t
δ1ns
)(
t
4n2s
+
σ2
t
δ1
)
− f = 0. (15)
Assume that the second-order condition is satisfied, so the FOC is both necessary and sufficient to
define a unique solution of n∗s.
Now, Rs < 0 if and only if E(pi) < f . Given that nb =
4ftn2s
t2+4δ1σ2n2s
, we have E(pi) =
nb
t
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
= 4fn
2
s
t2+4δ1σ2n2s
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
> f if and only if ns >
δ4t
σ , where δ4 =
4
√
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4 . Be-
cause Π′′(ns) < 0, n∗s >
δ4t
σ if and only if 0 = Π
′(n∗s) < Π′(
δ4t
σ ), which leads to
Ctf
z < σ
2(δ5µ+ δ6σ),
where δ5 ≡ 12 − 527
√
3 > 0 and δ6 ≡
4√12
324 (353− 189
√
3) > 0.
Turning to the buyer subsidy. Rb < 0 if and only if E(u) <
C
z nb. The first order condition (11)
gives nb =
z
8tC
4δ1σ2n2s+4µtns−t2
ns
. Plug this into E(u) and we find E(u) < Cz nb if and only if ns <
9t
2(µ+θ) ≡ n¯, where θ =
√
µ2 − 9δ3σ2. Because Π′′(ns) < 0, n∗s < n¯ if and only if 0 = Π′(n∗s) > Π′(n¯),
which is reduced to Ctfz > δ7 (µ+ θ) (µ − δ8θ)(µ − δ9θ), where θ =
√
µ2 − 9δ3σ2, δ7 = 4(35+12
√
3)
729 ,
δ8 =
22+
√
3
26 , and δ9 =
29+4
√
3
61 . It can be shown that the right hand side is increasing in both µ and
σ2, so the condition is less likely to be satisfied when σ2 is larger.
Proof of Proposition 2
(1) The necessary and sufficient condition for seller subsidy has been derived as Eq. (12), which
is re-produced here: Ctfz < σ
2(δ5µ+ δ6σ), where δ5 and δ6 are positive constants. Define a function
of σ: F (σ) ≡ δ6σ3 + δ5µσ2 − Ctfz . Because F (0) < 0, F (σ) > 0 when σ is sufficiently large, and
F ′(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0, there exists a unique σs > 0 such that F (σs) = 0. Seller subsidy requires
F (σ) > 0, which is then equivalent to σ > σs. Note that σs is a function of the two parameters, µ and
29
Ctf
z . We can re-write the definition of σs as: F
(
σs
(
µ, Ctfz
)
, µ, Ctfz
)
≡ 0. Then ∂F∂σ ∂σs∂µ + ∂F∂µ = 0.
Apparently ∂F∂σ > 0 and
∂F
∂µ > 0. Therefore
∂σs
∂µ < 0. Similarly,
∂F
∂σ
∂σs
∂(Ctfz )
+ ∂F
∂(Ctfz )
= 0. Because
∂F
∂σ > 0 and
∂F
∂(Ctfz )
< 0, we have ∂σs
∂(Ctfz )
> 0.
(2) The necessary and sufficient condition for buyer subsidy has been derived as Eq. (13), which
is re-produced here: Ctfz > δ7 (µ+ θ) (µ−δ8θ)(µ−δ9θ), where θ =
√
µ2 − 9δ3σ2, δ7 = 4(35+12
√
3)
729 >
0, δ8 =
22+
√
3
26 > 0, and δ9 =
29+4
√
3
61 > 0. It can be easily shown that the right hand side of
the inequality increases in both µ and σ. Therefore, if we define G(σ) = δ7 (µ+ θ) (µ − δ8θ)(µ −
δ9θ) − Ctfz , we will have G′(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0. Note that G(0) = 16729µ3 − Ctfz . If Ctfz ≤ 16729µ3,
we have G(σ) > G(0) ≥ 0 for any σ > 0. In that case, buyer subsidy never happens, as buyer
subsidy requires G(σ) < 0. If Ctfz >
16
729µ
3, then G(0) = 16729µ
3 − Ctfz < 0. Given that G(σ) > 0 for
sufficiently large σ, and G′(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0, there exists a unique σb > 0 such that F (σb) = 0.
Buyer subsidy requires G(σ) < 0, which is equivalent to σ < σb. Finally, we can prove
∂σb
∂µ < 0 and
∂σb
∂(Ctfz )
> 0 similarly as in (1).
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that Rs decreases with σ
2: From nb =
4ftn2s
t2+4δ1σ2n2s
we can solve t
2
n2s
= 4ftnb − 4δ1σ2. Plug
this into: Rs = E(pi)−f = nbt
[
t2
n2s
+ δ2σ
2
]
−f = nbt
[
4ft
nb
+ (δ2 − 4δ1)σ2
]
−f = 4f+(δ2−4δ1)σ2t nb−f .
Given the numerical values of δ1 and δ2, we know that δ2 < 4δ1. Then when σ
2 is larger, nb will
be larger, so Rs is smaller.
To prove Rb increases with σ
2: Rb = E(u)− Cz nb = µ− 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns− Cz z8tC 4δ1σ
2n2s+4µtns−t2
ns
=
µ− 5t4ns + σ
2
t δ3ns− σ
2
2t δ1ns− µ2 + t8ns =
µ
2 − 9t8ns + σ
2
t ns
(
δ3 − δ12
)
. But δ3 = 0.096 <
δ1
2 = 0.163, so we
need further manipulation. Now we use t
2
n2s
= 4ftnb −4δ1σ2: Rb =
µ
2 +
σ2
t ns
[(
δ3 − δ12
)
− 98 1σ2 t
2
n2s
]
= µ2 +
σ2
t ns
[(
δ3 − δ12
)
− 98 1σ2
(
4ft
nb
− 4δ1σ2
)]
= µ2 +
σ2
t ns
(
4δ1 + δ3 − 92 ftnbσ2
)
= µ2 +
σ2
t ns
(
4δ1 + δ3 − 92 ftnbσ2
)
.
We know that 4δ1 + δ3 > 0, and that ns and nb both increase with σ
2, so when σ2 is larger, σ
2
t ns
is larger, and
(
4δ1 + δ3 − 92 ftnbσ2
)
is also larger, so Rb is larger.
B Numerical Approximation
When ns is not too small,
δns+1
δns−1 ≈ 1 and nsδ
ns
(δns−1)2 ≈ 0. For example, when ns = 6,
δns+1
δns−1 = 1.00074
and nsδ
ns
(δns−1)2 = 0.00222. A larger ns leads to closer approximations (Table 2).
Our numerical study without applying approximation shows that the equilibrium ns is easily
well above 10. Thus, approximating δ
ns+1
δns−1 at 1 and
nsδns
(δns−1)2 at 0, which requires ns to be sufficiently
high, is consistent with the actual equilibrium.
30
Table 2: Numerical Examples
ns 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
δns+1
δns−1 1.00277 1.00074 1.00020 1.00005 1.00001 1.00000 1.00000
nsδns
(δns−1)2 0.00693 0.00222 0.00069 0.00021 0.00006 0.00002 0.00001
Based on this approximation, we can rewrite the following expressions:
gs(ns) = ns
(
1− 4
3
√
3
δns + 1
δns − 1 +
2ns
3
δns
(δns − 1)2
)
≈ δ2ns
gb(ns) = ns
(
1
6
√
3
δns + 1
δns − 1 −
ns
3
δns
(δns − 1)2
)
≈ δ3ns
where δ2 = 1− 43√3 and δ3 =
1
6
√
3
.
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